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NOTES
The Reemergence of the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine in Kentucky
BY EARL F. HAMM, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
We o said the king was dead? Only twelve years ago, the
ntucky Supreme Court left the age-old rule of sovereign
Y • immunity "that 'the King can do nowrong'" weakenedand
limited in scope.2 Since then, the Kentucky General Assembly and the
courts have slowly reclaimed an expansive view of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, including the Kentucky Supreme Court's recent four to three
decision in Withers v. University of Kentucky3 to extend sovereign
immunity to the University of Kentucky Medical Center.4
The right not to be sued is an enormous power. As one commentator
points out, the privilege of sovereign immunity "confers upon the
government an apparent advantage in the marketplace-unlike private
individuals and entities, the government is liable only to the extent it deems
"J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky.
'Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1530 (1992).
2See Dunlap v. University of Ky. Student Health Serv. Clinic, 716 S.W.2d 219
(Ky. 1986). The Kentucky General Assembly subsequently passed Kentucky
Revised Statutes sections 44.072 and 44.073, which rendered the opinion moot on
the issue of waiver of governmental immunity by the University by maintaining an
insurance fund. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] §§ 44.072-.073
(Michie 1997). In a subsequent case, Kentucky Centerfor the Arts Corp. v. Berns,
801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1991), the court held that sovereign immunity had been
waived without considering the 1986 amendments. See id. at 331.
I Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997).
4 Seeid. at 343.
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appropriate."' Generally, the Commonwealth of Kentucky cannot be sued
for damages without its consent.' The Kentucky Constitution places the
power to waive sovereign immunity, at least partially, on the shoulders of
the General Assembly.
7
The debate, therefore, is not about whether the Commonwealth
possesses immunity. It surely does. Instead, there are two sources of
conflict. First, and more importantly, there is the question as to the breadth
of sovereign immunity to which the state is entitled.8 In other words, to
what extent are the state and its agents protected from liability? The second
source of conflict is how much sovereign immunity the General Assembly
has intended to waive.9 The resolution of the first conflict limits the
solutions available to the second because the Commonwealth cannot waive
a power it does not possess. Both concerns are sources of conflict at issue
in the recent Withers opinion.10
In Kentucky, a person who sues the Commonwealth for negligence
must do so before the Board of Claims." The General Assembly estab-
5 Krent, supra note 1, at 1530.
6 See id. The state's immunity is not absolute. For example, the Commonwealth
of Kentucky is bound by the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution,
which prohibits "private property [to] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the United States Supreme Court
has not applied the Takings Clause to actions against the government under tort
law, it has applied the Takings Clause to create damage remedies under breach of
contract and loss of property theories. See Nollan v. California Coastal Conmn'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that a state statute requiring a beachfront property
owner to grant a public easement for beach users as a condition of securing a
permit to rebuild a residence on the property is a taking for which the owner is
entitled to just compensation); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a New York statute requiring owners of rental
condominiums to permit the installation of cable television equipment on their
property constitutes a compensable state "taking"); see also Krent, supra note 1,
at 1575-78 nn.186-196.
7 See KY. CoNST. § 231. Section 231 provides that "[t]he General Assembly
may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against
the Commonwealth." Id.
8 See Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Bems, 801 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Ky.
1991).
'See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 345.
'0 See id. at 342.
" See K.R.S. § 44.072 (Michie 1997). Section 44.072 provides:
It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide the means to enable
a person negligently injured by the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets,
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lished the Board of Claims as "a limited waiver of sovereign immunity." 2
The Board of Claims maintains direction over any suits that might arise
against the state, but reflects the legislature's intent to partially waive the
Commonwealth's sovereign immunity defense in limited circumstances. 3
The Board of Claims limits the jurisdiction, amount of damages, and the
scope of activity by the state or its agents that could produce liability. 4 At
issue in Withers were the 1986 amendments to the Board of Claims Act, 5 -
which protected state entities that had purchased insurance or created self-
departments, bureaus or agencies, orany of its officers, agents or employees
while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth
or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies to be able to assert
their just claims as herein provided. The Commonwealth thereby waives the
sovereign immunity defense only in the limited situations as herein set
forth. It is further the intention of the General Assembly to otherwise
expressly preserve the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth... in all
other situations except where sovereign immunity is specifically and
expressly waived as set foith by statute. The Board of Claims shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims for damages ....
Id.
12 Gray v. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, 973 S.W.2d
61, 64 (Ky. App. 1997).
13 See K.R.S. § 44.070(1). Section 44.070(1) provides:
A Board of Claims ... is created and vested with full power and authority
to investigate, hear proof, andto compensate persons for damages sustained
to either person or property as a proximate result of negligence on the part
of the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or
agencies, or any of its officers, agents, or employees while acting within the
scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets,
departments, bureaus, or agencies; ... [except] damages for mental distress
or pain or suffering, and compensation shall not be allowed, awarded, or
paid for said claims for damages.
Id.
14 See id.
" See id. The specific amendment at issue in Withers was section 44.073(14),
which states in pertinent part:
The filing of an action in court or any other forum or the purchase of
liability insurance or the establishment of a fund for self-insurance by the
Commonwealth, its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies or its
agents, officers, or employees thereof for a government related purpose or
duty shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity or any other
immunity or privilege thereby held.
Id. § 44.073(14).
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insurance pools. These acts had previously constituted a waiver of their
sovereign immunity defense.'6 Withers upheld the amendments, entitling
the University of Kentucky Medical Center ("UKMC") to the sovereign
immunity defense although it had contributed to a medical malpractice
compensation fund.'
7
The recent Withers decision is significant because it restricted the
waiver of sovereign immunity for a profitable arm of the state. Withers also
extended the sovereign immunity defense to an entity that both competes
with other private hospitals and had previously been exposed to liability in
negligence suits. 8 Moreover, the close margin of the decision suggests that
the scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine is still in question in
Kentucky. This Note will examine the breadth and propriety of Kentucky's
sovereign immunity doctrine in tort actions involving the Commonwealth.
Part I will discuss the legal issues and procedural history of the decision in
Withers v. University of Kentucky.19 Part I will also address the line of
precedents and statutes upon which the court based its opinion and how the
decision affects the current application of waiver to claims against the
Commonwealth. °
Part II argues that there is a constitutional challenge to the sovereign
immunity doctrine in Kentucky as applied by the 1986 amendments to the
Board of Claims Act.2' Kentucky courts have consistently applied sections
14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky ConstitutionP as a guarantee of "jural
rights" to those seeking claims under the common law.?3 The jural rights
doctrine limits the ability of the Commonwealth to employ sovereign
immunity as a defense. Recent decisions after Withers reaffirm both the
sovereign immunity and jural rights doctrines but do not resolve the
inherent conflict between them.24
6 See Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Ky. 1997); see also
Dunlap v. University ofKy. StudentHealth Serv. Clinic, 716 S.W.2d 219,220 (Ky.
1986).
7 See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 345.
" See Dunlap, 716 S.W.2d at 220.
'9 Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997).2oSee infra notes 26-93 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 94-164 and accompanying text.
22 KY. CONST. §§ 14, 54, 241.
' See Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991);
McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990); Gould v. O'Bannon,
770 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1989).
24 See infra notes 115-64 and accompanying text.
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Finally, this Note will conclude that the General Assembly is not the
only branch of government that should determine the scope of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. To vest that determination in one branch
would be to ignore Kentucky's constitutional tensions betweenjural rights
and the sovereign immunity doctrine. Generally, the General Assembly is
the optimal branch to decide when to grant waivers of sovereign immunity.
This authority, however, must be balanced with the constitutional rights of
those injured by negligent acts of the Commonwealth. Although the
judiciary's construction of waiver of the sovereign immunity defense in tort
actions against the Commonwealth has sometimes resulted in inconsistent
opinions,' it protects Kentucky citizens from unfair or unsavory results
without inhibiting Kentucky's political processes or the effective function-
ing of government.
I. WITHERS V UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
A. The Court's Decision
In Withers, the estate of Emilie M. Withers filed a claim for wrongful
death against the University of Kentucky and the physicians that adminis-
tered treatment to Ms. Withers, alleging medical negligence.26 Ms. Withers
allegedly died as the result of a misdiagnosis and a subsequent negligent
prescription of medications." Ms. Withers began her treatment at the
UKMC and remained in the care of a treating doctor in training, who was
under the supervision of two other physicians, until she died exactly one
month after her first visit.28
Although the estate of Ms. Withers alleged that the prescription of the
medication was negligent, the trial court did not determine "the involve-
ment of the treating physician, the pharmacist, the immediate supervisors
of the physician, the Medical Center itself and finally, the University." 29
Before the merits of the case were addressed, the University of Kentucky,
separate from the individual physicians, moved to dismiss the case on the
basis of sovereign immunity. 0 The trial court granted the University's
motion to dismiss and denied the motion by Ms. Withers's estate to set
I See Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 343-44 (Ky. 1997).
26 See id. at 342.
27See id. at 347 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).29Id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
30See id. at 342.
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aside the order ofdismissal.' The court of appeals affirmedthe dismissal.32
As the Kentucky Supreme Court later pointed out, the "claims [against the
individual physicians] were unaffected by the dismissal of the University
of Kentucky."'33
The Kentucky Supreme Court granted a discretionary review of the
case and affirmed the court of appeals in a four to three decision.34 The
court framed its decision in Withers aroundtwo interrelated issues: whether
the University of Kentucky was entitled to the protection of sovereign
immunity and, if so, whether the General Assembly had waived that
immunity by statute.35 The court held that the University of Kentucky was
entitled to immunity from claims of medical negligence at its medical
center.36 The court further heldthat statutes authorizing the UKMC to share
in a malpractice insurance fund were not a waiver of sovereign immunity
by the General Assembly.
37
B. The Berns Test
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Withers hinged on the
UKMC's status as a central part of the state. Three of the justices in the
majority concluded easily that the University of Kentucky was an arm of
the state entitled to sovereign immunity.3" More controversially, the court
further held that the UKMC was therefore a central part of the state,
observing that "this Court has no right to merely refuse to apply [sovereign
immunity] or abrogate the legal doctrine" with respect to the medical
center.39 The three justices in dissent countered that "the University andthe
Medical Center... are so independent from Central State Government that
they cannot claim the protection of sovereign immunity."
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 342 n. 1. The court asserted that sovereign immunity for the state did not
reach its agents, servants, and employees. See id.; see also Gould v. O'Bannon, 770
S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1989); Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959).
3 See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 340.
35 See id. at 343.
36 See id. at 346.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 343.
391 Id. at 344. The majority opinion consisted of Justices Cooper, Johnstone, and
Lambert. Chief Justice Stephens filed a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 346.
4 Id. at 349 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). Justices Graves and Stumbojoined
in Justice Wintersheimer's dissent. See id. at 346.
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The court's decision did not overrule the determinative case law for the
application of sovereign immunity. Instead, the court fit its holding within
the rubric of Kentucky Center for the Arts Corp. v. Berns.4 In Berns, the
court utilized a test first recognized in Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson Co.
Metropolitan SewerDistrict2 for determining whether an entity is entitled
to sovereign immunity. TheBerns court explainedthe test as follows: "This
is a two-pronged test, the first consisting of the 'direction and control of the
central State government,' and the second consisting of being 'supported
by monies which are disbursed by authority of the Commissioner of
Finance out of the State treasury."' 43
The Withers majority asserted that "[t]he judiciary has the ultimate
power, andthe duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases,
sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the
controversies before it." Certainly, this assertion is not in dispute. The
majority used this as a constitutional leg to stand on, concluding that "[tihe
determination ofwhether an entity is entitled to protection by the constitu-
tional principle of sovereign immunity is for the judiciary."45 Next, the
Withers court applied the Berns test and concluded that the University of
Kentucky met the requirements of Berns "unmistakably [because] the
University of Kentucky operates under the direction and control of central
state government and.., is funded from the State Treasury."
The Berns court applied the two-pronged test to a set of facts similar
to those in Withers.47 In Berns, Mr. Berns was injured when he fell down
a set of steps in front of the Kentucky Center for the Arts after a handrail
allegedly came loose as he was holding it to maintain his balance.48 The
rationale for the Berns test is easy to follow. In situations in which the
state undertakes a typically governmental function with significant
supervision or control from the state government and acts or fails to act
reasonably, sovereign immunity applies.49 If the government entity acts
41 Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1991).
42Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metro. Sewer Dist., 346 S.W.2d 754 (Ky.
1961).
43 Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 331 (quoting Gnau, 346 S.W.2d at 755).
44 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 342 (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186,209 (Ky. 1989)).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 343.
47 SeeBerns, 801 S.W.2d at 328.
48 See id.
49See id. at 331.
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somewhat independently, such as having its own board of governors and
no supervision from the state, then sovereign immunity would not apply.50
The Berns court held that the Kentucky Center for the Arts was not
entitled to sovereign immunity because it performed "substantially the
same functions as any private business engaged in the entertainment
business."'"
The opinion in Withers, written by Justice Lambert who concurredwith
the opinion inBerns, conceded that the Berns decision makes "a distinction
between a governmental function and a proprietary function performed by
an entity having governmental roots."52 In addition, Justice Lambert
acknowledged the precedent of a turn-of-the-century case, Gross v.
Kentucky Board of Managers,53 that held that "not every corporation
created by the state is entitled to sovereign immunity."'54 To these argu-
ments, Justice Lambert distinguished the facts of Withers.5 He observed
that operating a hospital is an integral part of a medical school's govern-
mental function and reasoned that the "teaching and research function" of
a public medical school is to provide the education and training requisite
to acquire accreditation. 6 The UKMC met the requirements of the Berns
test and, thus, secured the sovereign immunity defense subject to any
subsequent waiver.
The most significant result of Justice Lambert's opinion is that the
Berns test remains valid law. To its credit, the Withers court acknowledged
that Kentucky's appellate courts had produced inconsistent rules of law
concerning sovereign immunity.58 The essence of the court's decision was
not to amend the language of the Berns test, but to extend the applicability
of the language to more state entities. In either instance, the net effect
would have beenthe same, but by retaining theBerns language, the Withers
court was able to stabilize the rule of law and enact a broad policy change
without much linguistic struggle.
50 See id.
5 1 Id.
52 Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340,343 (Ky. 1997).
53 Gross v. Kentucky Bd. of Managers, 49 S.W. 458 (Ky. 1899).
A Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 343 (citing Gross, 49 S.W. at 459).
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 343-44 ("Upon our determination that University of Kentucky is
entitled to sovereign immunity, we must next consider whether or in what manner
there has been a legislative waiver of immunity.").
5
1 See id. at 344.
[VOL. 87
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
C. The Issue of Waiver
In both Berns and Withers, the Kentucky Supreme Court sought to
determine two issues: first, whether the state entity was entitled to
sovereign immunity, and second, whether the purchase of liability
insurance waived immunity. 9 The Berns court never addressed the issue
of waiver because it found the Kentucky Center for the Arts to be out-
side the scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine.' Put another way, the
Center for the Arts had no immunity to waive. Therefore, the Berns court
did not consider the effect of the 1986 amendments to the Board of Claims
Act.61
The Withers court stated that "the granting of waiver is a matter
exclusively legislative." 2 This rule is consistent with a line of cases that
defer the determination of waiver to the legislature.63 Specifically, in
Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic,' the
court interpreted an enabling statute that authorized a malpractice
compensation self-insurance fund to be a partial waiver of sovereign
immunity.65 TheDunlap court examinedthe language of Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 164.939, which" 'authoriz[ed] the University of Kentucky
to establish from its own funds other than general tax revenues a basic
coverage compensation fund to assure itself that health care malpractice
claims or judgments against itself, or its agencies will be satisfied.'- 66 The
59 See id. at 342; Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327,
328 (Ky. 1991).
6 See Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 332.
61 See id.
62 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 344.
63 See Kestler v. Transit Auth., 758 S.W.2d 38,40 (Ky. 1988) (holding that a
statute requiring the transit authority to maintain insurance was a partial waiver of
immunity). The Kestler court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
"deeply planted in the law of the Commonwealth through Section 231 of the
Kentucky Constitution." Id. at 39; see also Dunlap v. University of Ky. Student
Health Serv. Clinic, 716 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1986) (holding that when a statute
provides a hospital with an insurance fund, sovereign immunity is partially
waived); Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 167 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1942)
(holding that when a statute allows a school board to set aside funds to provide for
insurance against negligent bus drivers, sovereign immunity is partially waived).
61 Dunlap v. University of Ky. Student Health Serv. Clinic, 716 S.W.2d 219
(Ky. 1986).65 See id. at 222.
66Id. at 220 (quoting K.R.S. § 164.939) (emphasis omitted).
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Dunlap court determined that "[fjrom the words of this statute, legislative
waiver is plain in its meaning and intent."'67
Logically, the court's holding in Dunlap makes sense. If a state entity
was not expecting a lawsuit, it would not protect itself by investing its
own funds in accounts specifically designated for liability payments. A
prudent state entity expecting a lawsuit would buy insurance. Moreover,
accumulating taxpayer dollars in self-insurance pools when, in fact, the
agency was immune to suit would be a wasteful allocation of public
resources. Nevertheless, the General Assembly's adoption of the amend-
ments to the Board of Claims Act in 1986 effectively overruled Dunlap by
requiring an express waiver in order to forfeit immunity.68 Therefore, the
Withers decision simply created new law from an interpretation of
"new" statutes, rather than modifying or overruling past law. The 1986
amendments created an avenue for the court to uphold the extension of
sovereign immunity to governmental purchasers of liability insurance.
The amendments, combined with the broader interpretation of the Berns
test, allowed the Withers court to stretch the acknowledgment of the
sovereign immunity of the University of Kentucky 69 to the corporate
entities within the University of Kentucky that insured themselves against
negligence claims.
70
D. The Dissenting Opinion
The three dissenting justices in Withers agreed with the majority that
the Berns test was applicable but argued that the majority misapplied the
standard.7 ' Justice Wintersheimer, the author of the Withers dissent,
67 id.
68 See supra notes 2, 21 and accompanying text. This is also true of counties,
which are entities of the state but are not included in the Board of Claims Acts. In
Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997), the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that neither a statute authorizing a county to buy insurance for its
employees nor the county's participation in a self-insurance fund acts as a waiver
of the county's sovereign immunity. See id. at 203-04.
69 See Frederick v. University of Ky. Med. Ctr., 596 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. App.
1979) (expressly recognizing the immune status of the University of Kentucky),
overruled by Dunlap v. University of Ky. Student Health Serv. Clinic, 716 S.W.2d
219 (Ky. 1986). As stated above, the Dunlap decision was rendered moot as far as
it stated that the creation of a liability self-insurance fund constituted a waiver of
sovereign immunity. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
70 See Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ky. 1997).
71 See id. at 347 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). Justice Wintersheimer was
joined in his dissent by Justices Graves and Stumbo. See id. at 346.
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reasoned that "there are two classes of powers inherent in the nature of
government." I The dissent classified these powers as governmental and
proprietary.73 Naturally, an entity of the government that exercised
primarily governmental functions would be entitled to sovereign
immunity.74 An entity engaged in functions that are primarily carried out
by the private sector, however, would not be so entitled.7 The dissent
argued that rather than endorsing a blanket rule of sovereign immunity,
each situation in which a governmental entity fails to act reasonably or acts
negligently should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as to whether
sovereign immunity exists.76
The dissent argued correctly that a case-by-ease analysis by the
judiciary is appropriate,77 but it failed to acknowledge the proper deference
that should be given to the General Assembly. After all, the legislature is
still the constitutional grantor of sovereign immunity and waiver.
71
Essentially, the dissent endorsed a balancing test, such as the Berns test.
Justice Wintersheimer, however, offered that "[tlhe majority opinion in
[Withers] breaks entirely new ground based on a misunderstanding of the
legislative response to Dunlap and in effect overrules Berns as well as a
number of other cases, both old and new."'79 In sum, Justice Wintersheimer
agreed with the majority in utilizing the Berns test as a balancing approach
in determiningthe UKMC's eligibility for the sovereign immunity defense,
but he concluded that by wrongly determining the UKMC to be eligible,
the majority had given a whole new meaning to the test."°
E. The ChiefJustice's Concurrence
The brief concurrence of former Chief Justice Stephens81 in Withers
constituted the fourth vote to affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
7 Id. at 348 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
74See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
7 See id. at 347 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (citing Calvert Inv., Inc. v.
Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1991), which
held that governmental agencies performing services similarto private counterparts
should be held liable for negligent actions).
76 See id. at 348 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
' See id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
78 See KY. CONST. § 231.
71 Withers, 939 S.W.2d. at 352 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
8 oSee id. (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
st See Justice Stephens was replaced as Chief Justice by Justice Lambert on
October 5, 1998. Hail to New Chief Lambert Sworn as Leader of Kentucky
Supreme Court, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 6, 1998, at B 1.
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Significantly, Chief Justice Stephens argued that the Berns test should not
even be used. 2 The divisive issue between the majority opinion and the
concurrence was which arm of the government should decide when
sovereign immunity should be granted. Chief Justice Stephens stated that
inBerns, the court "went too far and usurped a function squarely within the
discretion of the legislature."83 Chief Justice Stephens advocated the return
to greater deference to the General Assembly.84 The three justices in the
majority, however, must have been unwilling to cede this power to the
legislature given that they chose to adopt the Berns test. 5 Consistent with
the case law of the last half century, both the majority and the dissent were
more comfortable keeping the ultimate discretion to make decisions about
sovereign immunity within the judicial branch.
8 6
Although the Chief Justice's concurrence tipped the balance of the
court to favor sovereign immunity for the UKMC, the Chief Justice agreed
with neither the majority nor the dissent regarding their considerations of
the sovereign immunity doctrine." Chief Justice Stephens relied on the
original intent of the drafters of the constitution.8 Considering the language
of section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution, which states that "[t]he
General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts
suits maybe brought against the Commonwealth,18 9 Chief Justice Stephens
suggested that judicial constructions such as the Berns test do not "comport
with the purpose the original drafters of our constitution had in mind."9
Chief Justice Stephens's opinion contrasts squarely with the Berns
court. The Berns court stated:
The only positive conclusion one can draw from the various cases is that
the appropriate line separating persons and entities entitled to claim
inclusion in the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity is not a line which
82See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346-47 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
I31d. at 346 (Stephens, CJ., concurring).
84 See id. at 347 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
85 See id. at 342.
86 See id. at 342, 347. The test that would later become known as the Berns test
was first recognized in Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metro. Sewer Dist., 346
S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1961). See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 342; supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
87 See Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346-47 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
88 See id. at 347 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
9 Ky. CONST. § 23 1.
90 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 347 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
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the General Assembly may draw in its discretion, but a problem of
constitutional law which our Court must address on a case by case basis.
91
Because the increasing number of endeavors that the state undertakes
"opens it to the possibility of negligent conduct which must be compen-
sated in a reasonable fashion,"92 allowing the General Assembly to adjust
the coverage of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is "an alternative to
private, special legislation" for every negligence suit against the Common-
wealth.93 The increasing expanse ofgovernmental andproprietary functions
of the state requires an active, not passive, judiciary to determine eligibility
for sovereign immunity.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Introduction
The constitution authorizes the General Assembly to create certain
causes of action and standards of evidence. The jural rights doctrine
protects causes of action that preexisted the 1891 constitution, such as
common law negligence or gross negligence. Kentucky courts created,
recognized, and instructed juries according to standards of care prior to
ratification. The jural rights doctrine preserves these causes of action and
standards. The doctrine itself is quite controversial. To proponents, it spares
the courts from starting anew because it leaves intact an extensive body of
common law. To opponents, it is an indirect usurpation of legislative
powers by the judiciary.
Taken literally, the reading of sections 14, 54, 231, and 241 of the
Kentucky Constitution should cause some confusion. Sections 14, 54, and
241 grant recovery rights to plaintiffs,94 and section 231 limits the liability
of the state as a defendant.95 Since the adoption of the current constitution
in 1891, Kentucky courts have sprinkled the original intent behind the
constitutional language with judicial interpretations of emerging issues to
produce a montage of law that is neither completely textually based nor
entirely judicially constructed. Part of the confusion stems from the
91Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327,329 (Ky. 1990).
92 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 348 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
93 Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 329.
94 See KY. CONST. §§ 14, 54, 241.
95See id. § 231.
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apparent conflict between the sovereign immunity and jural rights
doctrines.
B. Constitutional Basis of the Jural Rights Doctrine
The bases for the jural rights doctrine are provided in sections 14, 54,
and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution.96 Section 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay." 97 Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution reads:
"The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or
property."98 Section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution states:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by
negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be
recovered for such death, from corporations and persons so causing the
same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such
damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of
the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the
recovery shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made,
the same shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person.
99
Taken together, these sections form the cornerstone of what Kentucky
courts have interpreted as jural rights that protect common law tort
actions."° Section 14 is part of the bill of rights in Kentucky's first
constitution of 1792.10 Sections 54 and 241 were added in the fourth (and
9 See id. §§ 14, 54,241.
97 Id. § 14.
98 Id. § 54.
99 Id. § 241.
1 Iwill continue to referto sections 14,54, and 241 as thejural rights doctrine,
as does Professor Lewis, but as he points out, "the court frequently refers to the
sections in combination as the 'open courts' provisions of the constitution."
Thomas P. Lewis,JuralRights UnderKentucky's Constitution: Realities Grounded
in Myth, 80 KY. L.J. 953, 954 (1992) (citation omitted). Incidentally, although I
disagree with Professor Lewis's ultimate conclusion about the appropriate reading
of the jural rights doctrine, my disagreement should not be viewed as a criticism
of his outstanding teaching and scholarship.
101 See Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Ky. 1991).
[VOL. 87
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
current) constitution of 1891.102 These sections were read together in 1932
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Ludwig v. Johnson10 3 The Ludwig
court examined the status of common law claims at the time of the 1891
ratification.'0 4 It found that among citizens who were injured, each victim
possessed extensive rights to appear before a court and seek recovery from
the tortfeasor.'05 Specifically, the court held that section 54 could only be
read with the other two:
When... section [54] is read in connection with other sections of the
same instrument, such as sections 14 and 241 [establishing right to
recover for wrongful death], the conclusion is inescapable that the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to inhibit the Legislature
from abolishing rights of action for damages for death or injuries caused
by negligence.
0 6
Arguably, the Ludwig court construed the language of each section to
be intertwined with the others, as defined by the common law rights of
section 23317 A subsequent decision interpreted section 14 "to preserve
those jural rights which had become well established prior to the adoption
of the Constitution.""0 8
The other element ofthejural rights doctrine is found in section 241.19
It provides that damages may be recovered for the death of a person caused
by a negligent act or omission."11 Section 241 does not provide an
exception based on the" identity of the tortfeasor, whether individual,
corporate, or governmental.' Prior to the Withers interpretation of the
Board of Claims amendments, Kentucky law required a case-by-case
o2 See id.
103 Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
104 The court stated that "[n]o exception is made to the provision that every
person for any injury done him in his person shall have remedy by due course of
law." Id. at 350.
105 See id.
106 id.
1
07 See KY. CONST. § 233 (adopting the general and natural laws of Virginia in
1792 as the common law of Kentucky).
' Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Ky. 1959); see also Kentucky
Utilities Co. v. Jackson CountyRuralElec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788,790 (Ky.
1968).
109 KY. CONST. § 241.
110 See id.
"' See id.
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analysis of whether a particular agency was entitled to immunity for its
acts. " Ifjural rights are, in fact, common law rights, the General Assembly
would have infringed upon these rights by providing immunity for all
government agencies without regard to their function.
C. Judicial Affirmation ofJural Rights
In Withers, the estate of Ms. Withers failed to give notice to the
attorney general that it was challenging the constitutionality of a statute and
thus failed to preserve the constitutional argument of the jural rights
doctrine against the Board of Claims amendments." 3 Therefore, the
Withers court did not consider the constitutional validity ofthejural rights
doctrine against the amendments to the Board of Claims Act. The lack of
formal constitutional challenge didnot stop the court from prognosticating,
as it added in dictum that the "appellants' constitutional claims would
appear to be insubstantial."'" 4 Although this language is nonbinding, it is
certainly a strong indicator of decisions regarding the sovereign immunity
doctrine in the near future by this particular court.
Most recently, the court affirmed Withers in Franklin County, Kentucky
v. Malone. 5 In Malone, a prisoner committed suicide while in custody."
6
The administrator of the prisoner's estate brought a wrongful death action
against the attendingpolice officer, several county officials, the county, and
the state."7 The circuit court dismissed the complaint."' "The Court of
Appeals reversed in part and held that the sovereign immunity of [Franklin
County] had been waived to the extent of liability insurance purchased" by
the county." 9 The supreme court reinstated the circuit court's decision in
favor of summary judgment based on the philosophy of Withers, which
held that the purchase of liability insurance was not a waiver of sovereign
immunity. 20 Thus, because counties receive the sovereign immunity
". See Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Ky. 1991);
Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1991).
1" See Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Ky. 1997). Notice
to the attorney general of a constitutional challenge to a statute is required. See
K.R.S. § 418.075 (Michie 1992).
14 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346.
"I Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997).
1 6 See id. at 198-99.
17 See id.
"' See id. at 199.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 203.
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protection of section 231 and are not included in the Board of Claims Act,
the court reasoned Mr. Malone could not recover against Franklin
County.'
21
In Malone, the court acknowledged the factual similarity between
Berns and Withers:
It could be argued that Withers, like Berns, was an extension of the pure
governmental function. However, in this case there is clearly a govern-
ment responsibility and a discharge of that responsibility although it is
claimed to have been negligent. Accordingly, because the particular case
before us involves a clear governmental duty, and this Court has chosen
to extend the protection of sovereign immunity to even possibly marginal
claims of governmental activity, we must conclude that the protection of
sovereign immunity against civil lawsuit is available to the parties sued
in this action. 1
Essentially, the Malone decision does nothing to further the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. To summarize, the court simply stated that the
Withers philosophy applies to counties.lu The governmental function of a
jail is obvious. Even the dissenters in Withers signed on to the Malone
decision. 24 The Malone court did not address, however, the constitutional
questions raised by the jural rights doctrine as applied to the court's
application of sovereign immunity and resorted to the Board of Claims for
a remedy.
Not all jurists and commentators are convincedthat section 14 supports
ajural rights doctrine. Professor Thomas Lewis argues that sections 14, 54,
and 241 were never meant to be read together."z In Professor Lewis's
discussion of Johnson v. Higgins,126 a court of appeals case decided in
186 1,127 he points out that the plaintiff based a jural rights argument upon
article 13, section 15 of the 1850 constitution 128 (the precursor to section 14
121 See id. at 204-05.
2 Id. at 205.
' 23 See id.
12 Justices Wintersheimer and Graves, who dissented in Withers, joined the
majority opinion in Malone. Justice Stumbo, who also dissented in Withers,
partially concurred in Malone. See id.; Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d
340, 346 (Ky. 1997).
25See Lewis, supra note 100, at 954.
126 Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566 (1861).
127 See Lewis, supra note 100, at 967.
12 8 KY. CONST. art. XIII, § 15 (1850).
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of the current constitution).'29 The Higgins court rejected a jural rights
doctrine in favor of a simpler construction.130 The court held that the "open
courts" provision meant only that the courts should be open and fair.'3 ' The
court concluded that "[a]ny other construction would make [section 15 of
the 1850 constitution] inconsistent with other clauses of the constitution,
and, in fact, render it practically absurd."'32 Professor Lewis concludes that
the jural rights doctrine is nothing more than a judicial invention that has
no constitutional basis.
33
Despite Professor Lewis's scholarship, the supreme court reaffirmed
the legitimacy of the jural rights doctrine in Williams v. Wilson.'34 In
Williams, the court addressedthe constitutionality ofthe Kentucky punitive
damages statute.'35 The statute required a standard of "subjective
awareness" on the part of the defendant before a plaintiff could request
punitive damages. 36 The defendant in this case was represented before the
court but did not make a personal appearance at trial.137 Thus, the plaintiff
could not show "subjective awareness" in accordance with the statute and
challenged the constitutionality of the statute, asking instead for a common
law jury instruction of gross negligence.13 The trial court held the statute
unconstitutional and allowed a "punitive damages instruction based on
common law gross negligence.' 39
The court of appeals held that the punitive damages statute offended
sections 14, 15, and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution by precluding the
common law right to seek punitive damages."4 The Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmedboth lower courts, holding that the punitive damages statute
violated the jural rights doctrine. 141 The court summarized the jural rights
doctrine as follows:
'29 See Lewis, supra note 100, at 966-67.
130 See Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) at 566.
131 See id.
'32 Id. at 571; see also Lewis, supra note 100, at 967 (discussing Johnson v.
Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566, 571 (1861)).
133 See Lewis, supra note 100, at 967.
134 Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998).
135 See id. at 260.
1"6 See K.R.S. § 411.184 (Michie 1992).
131 See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 261.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 269.
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Sections 14, 54 and 241 have been interpreted to work in tandem and to
establish a limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to limit
common law rights to recover for personal injury or death. The fact that
these provisions might not have been "conceived as some sort of
package" does not prevent them from being construed together to arrive
at a separate principle. 142
The court continued "that Sections 14, 54 and 241 of our Constitution
render certain common law rights impervious to legislative dilution or
destruction. Such rights are therefore subject to the same restrictions with
respect to modification by the General Assembly as are constitutional
provisions.""
The court's opinion is certainly not evidence that the questions
concerning thejural rights doctrine have been solved. The court admits that
the doctrine has been applied inappropriately in the past.144 It concludes,
however, that those errors were "not from fundamental misconception."'
145
The dissenting and concurring opinions took issue with the constitu-
tional basis of the majority's decision. Justice Cooper filed a dissenting
opinion that echoed the arguments of Professor Lewis.'4 He argued that the
punitive damage statutes addressed only the standard and not the right to
sue, even if such a thing as a "jural right" exists.'47 Interestingly, Chief
Justice Stephens wrote a concurring opinion stating that the jural rights
doctrine, whether correct or not, has been part of the law since at least
1932.141 Therefore, he argued, although the jural rights doctrine should be
reexamined, a public debate should occur before such a long line of
precedent is overturned.
149
D. Resolution of the Conflict Between Doctrines?
The outcome of a constitutional challenge to the sovereign immunity
doctrine as set forth in Withers is uncertain. Starting with Perkins v.
Northeastern LogHomes,150 the Kentucky Supreme Court shifted direction
142 Id. at 267 (quoting Lewis, supra note 100, at 972).
143 Id. at 268.
4 See id. at 269.
145 Id.
"I See id. (Cooper, J., dissenting).
14" See id. at 270 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 269 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
149 See id. (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
.50Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
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and no longer reads the constitutional provisions through the prism of a
nineteenth century lens.' In fact, the court said in Perkins that "the
Kentucky Constitution must be applied to fundamental jural rights as
presently accepted in society, not frozen in time to the year 1891."152 The
judicial branch has determined that there is something special about the
interplay among the sections.13 In Perkins, the court held that no other
state constitution "has anything like the combination of broad constitu-
tional protection of individual rights against legislative interference
vouchsafedby our 1891 Kentucky Constitution."' 1 4 The court steppedback
from this statement somewhat in Williams,'55 butthepoint is clear: thejural
rights doctrine is here to stay regardless of its origin. The question now
should be its application and precisely what it encompasses.
It always has been and should continue to be a function of the courts
to determine when state agencies are immune and when they are not. The
Withers court reaffirmed that"[t]he judiciary has the ultimate power... to
apply [and] interpret .. .the Kentucky Constitution."'56 This power
' See id. at 817; see also McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15, 18-
19 (Ky. 1990).
152 Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817.
" The cases decided between Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1957),
and Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991), did little to
diminish the authority of the three sections combined. See Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at
817; Gouldv. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Ky. 1989); Carney v. Moody, 646
S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Kentucky
Utilities Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.
1969).
'54 Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 818.
'55 See Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260,268 (Ky. 1998).
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of our jural rights decisions has
been the "constitutionalization" of newly discovered rights. This heavily
criticized concept is best exemplified inPerkins v. NortheasternLogHomes
Whatever the wisdom of the extension of the jural rights doctrine from
its point of origin, i.e., preservation of well established rights to recover
damages for negligently inflicted injury or death as recognized in 1891, the
outcome in this case does not depend on the validity of any such extension.
The rights at issue here were well established in 1891 and the courts below
have properly applied the jural rights doctrine to prevent legislative erosion
or abolishment.
Id.
156 Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. 1997) (quoting
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989)).
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includes a court's ability to determine the nature of the state agency as well
as the particular function being carried out by the state agency, similar to
the factors included in the Berns test."5 The 1986 Board of Claims
amendments stripped the judiciary of some of this power. Ifthejural rights
doctrine is enforceable at all, by adopting the Board of Claims amend-
ments, the General Assembly wrongfully usurped the courts' duty to
determine immunities according to the common law traditions handed
down before the ratification of the constitution in 1891.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied in Withers and Malone
does not hold up well under certain hypotheticals. For example, suppose
that two people are injured in an automobile collision. One person is taken
in an ambulance to the UKMC and the other is taken to a private hospital.
Ifbothpersons are treated or diagnosed negligently and an injury is caused,
the patient who was by chance brought by ambulance to the University of
Kentucky has no rights in the courts of general jurisdiction against the
hospital, whereas the patient taken by ambulance to the private hospital
does. 5 ' The UKMC is in competition with other local hospitals in the
central Kentucky area. It even advertises forbusiness. Including the UKMC
within the umbrella of sovereign immunity under the amendments to the
Board of Claims statutes creates an absurd policy result and arguably
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 59
The dissent in Withers points out that "if a teaching hospital is so different
from its competitive neighbors, such a policy should be clearly set out
by either the General Assembly or as a last resort, developed by this
Court.,,,60
The variety of opinions in the Withers court reflects the inherent
tension between section 231 and the group of sections 14, 54, and 241.
Section 231, if interpreted most broadly, states that the Commonwealth
could bar any suit against itself.'6' The jural rights sections, if interpreted
literally, would allow a Kentucky citizen to sue any state entity.' 62 Section
231 authorizes the General Assembly to control the state's liability.6 3 The
'
57 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
158 I would like to acknowledge Joe C. Savage, attorney for Savage, Garmer &
Elliott and co-ghost writer of the amicus curiae brief for Ms. Withers, who
originated this hypothetical.
159 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
160 Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 348 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
'
61 See KY. CONST. § 231.
162 See id. §§ 14, 54, 241.
163 See id. § 231.
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jural rights sections place that power exclusively in the hands of the
judiciary.16 These readings seem contradictory.
I. CONCLUSION
The Withers decision expanded the sovereign immunity doctrine by
limiting the amount of waiver granted by the Commonwealth. The jural
rights doctrine is an effective challenge to the sovereign immunity doctrine,
within limits. If the court assumes responsibility for determining when
sovereign immunity is appropriate, it creates a balancing test between
section 231 and the group of sections 14, 54, and 241. Neither the jural
rights doctrine nor the sovereign immunity provision in the Kentucky
Constitution can be interpreted exactly as they are written. Otherwise, one
would contradict the other. Support for the jural rights doctrine implicitly
supports judicial interpretation of the appropriate "level" of sovereign
immunity the citizens of Kentucky should tolerate. This has been and
shouldremain primarily a legislative function. The courts, however, should
continue to interpret the functions of governmental entities in order to
preserve the intent of the 1891 ratifiers. Finally, societal and political
policy objectives mandate that some level of sovereign immunity remain
as a viable doctrine. Governmental functions should remain under the
umbrella of sovereign immunity to insure the soundness of decision
making without the threat of litigation.
The obvious, if not politically feasible, solution is for the legislature to
waive the sovereign immunity of proprietary and corporate arms of state
government. The problems with this proposal are twofold. First, there is
little economic incentive for the government to shed itself of profitable
entities that can compete in private markets without the liability that its
competitors confront. Second, there is a scant amount of public support for
a rewriting of the Board of Claims Act. The loudest noise is from plaintiffs'
attorneys. 15 Conversely, a conspicuous murmur is heard from attorneys
defending state entities."s The persons most affected by the sovereign
immunity defense, injured plaintiffs, are unfortunately not a vocal
participant in the debate.
'64 See id. §§ 14, 54, 241.
65 See BriefofAmicus Curiae, Kentucky Academy of Trial Attorneys, Withers
v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997) (96-SC-17-DG).
1' See Brief for Appellee, Withers v. University of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.
1997) (96-SC-17-DG).
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There is a tremendous barrier preventing collective action from
potential plaintiffs who are likelyuninformed about the possibility that they
will not have a cause of action against the state for its negligent acts.
Insuring one's constitutional tort remedies is rarely a politically salient
issue until a family member is injured. The Berns test must retain its teeth.
Thus, courts should continue to balance the damage to the injured person,
who stands to recover nothing from the negligent governmental actor,
against the potential hindrance to the legislative and executive branches in
exercising authority or advancing policies.

